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INTRODUCTION 
The Public Utility Regulatory PolicIes Act! (PURPA) became 
law on November 9, 1978. It was part of a larger package of energy 
legIslatIOn passed by the 95th Congress. The legIslatIon was de­
sIgned to deal exclusIvely with public utility Issues and theIr Im­
pact on energy use and conservatIon. 
PURPA IS a product of SIgnificant compromIse between the 
PreSIdent, the House, and the Senate. The ongmal House bill,2 
whICh adopted much of the PresIdent's proposal, was substantIally 
more directory than the final legIslatIon. The bill sought to estab­
lish natIonal mmImum retail electnc rate desIgn standards and poli­
CIes. A provISIOn m the bill reqUIred that rates reflect the costs of 
servIce and be based upon the tIme of day and season m whICh the 
energy was bemg used, except when these factors would not be 
cost effectIve. 
The Senate versIOn3 was more adVISOry than either the PreSI­
dent's or the House s versIOn. It generally did not reqUIre states to 
adopt certam types of rates, but rather the Senate versIOn author­
Ized the Secretary of Energy to mtervene m state regulatory pro­
ceedings m order to advocate three broad purposes: energy conser 
vahon, effiCIent use of facilities, and equitable ratemakmg. It did 
reqUIre, however the establishment of lifeline rates4 for certam 
elderly consumers. 
The bill that emerged from the conference, whIch was subse­
quently enacted mto law resembles the Senate verSIon. ThIS IS 
partIcularly true with regard to the removal of any reqUIrements 
placed upon states for the adophon of partIcular types of rate de­
1. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). 
2. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). 
3. S. 2114, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). 
4. Lifeline IS rate form In whICh the smallest users pay less for electrIcity 
than would be Justified on cost basIS. There are several varIations of lifeline rates. 
The most common IS one In whICh relatively small amount IS charged for the first 
400 kilowatt hours and Increased thereafter. 
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sIgn. The bill reflects the Senate s desIre to leave rate desIgn au­
thority pnmarily with state regulatory bodies. The compromIse was 
the result of substantIal lobbymg by consumers, utilitIes, and state 
regulatory commISSIOns actmg through the NatIonal AssocIatIon of 
Regulatory Utility CommIssIOners. Consumers typICally favored the 
House bill while the utilities and regulatIon commlSSIOns supported 
the Senate verSIOn. It IS questIonable whether the degree of com­
promlse was so great that the resultmg legIslatIon has become little 
more than an empty shell. 
ThIS paper discusses vanous prOVISIons of PURPA. It concen­
trates on procedural Issues raIsed by title I and on those Issues of 
most concern to consumers and theIr representatIves. It suggests 
varIOUS strategies for usmg title I to assIst consumer actIVIsts who 
have legal, accountIng, economIC or engmeenng backgrounds. Re­
garding these suggested strategIes, however, there are two caveats. 
First, each suggestIon must be evaluated m light of peculiar local 
conditIons. ConsIderatIon must be gIven to resources at hand, dis­
positIon and attitude of the regulatory authoritIes and utilitIes, and 
local pnoritIes. Second, the suggestIons are meant to assIst the 
consumer actIVIst who IS representmg pnncipally reSIdentIal con­
sumers or a subclass of such consumers. 
I. SCOPE OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY 

POLICIES ACT (PURPA) 

PURPA has few prohibitIons or specific mandates other than 
those of an mformatIon gathenng sort. It lS deSIgned to mSure that 
regulatory authorities at the federal, state, and local level conSIder 
vanous public utilitIes practIces and accept or reject them as bemg 
"appropnate. The Act reqmres that vanous heanngs be held and 
procedural rules be followed, and that certam people and mterests, 
mcluding the federal government through the Department of En­
ergy (DOE), be permitted to partICIpate (titles I and III). 
In additIon, PURPA, m its less publiCIzed titles, reqmres a 
lessenmg of barners to mterconnectIon among utiltIes, a wheeling 
of power by utilitIes, and a pooling among utilitIes (title II). It en­
courages productIon of electnc power by cogeneratIon and by small 
facilitIes utilizmg renewable energy sources mcluding bIOmass and 
water The prohibitIon agamst rate discnmmatIon by electrIC utili­
tIes toward such producers and the proVISIOn of certam loan pro­
grams to asslst m the planmng and constructIon of small hydroelec­
tnc facilitIes also encourages productIon of electnc power (titles II 
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and IV). Furthermore, the Act addresses the problems assocIated 
with the transportatIon of crude oil (title V) and the availability of 
crude oil and natural gas (title VI). Finally the Act establishes 
funding for vanous research efforts mcluding the Utility Regulatory 
Institute and coal research laboratones (title VI), and it provIdes 
finanCIal aSSIstance to state regulatory authoritIes and nonregulated 
utilitIes to comply with the Act's reqUIrements (titles I, III, VI). 
II. SCOPE OF TITLE I 
Title 15 of PURPA will have little direct Impact m the more 
progressIve state regulatory junsdictIons. Over the last several 
years, these junsdictIons have addressed the PURPA Issues of rate 
restructunng, ImplementatIon of restnctIons on termmatIon of 
servICe, and automatIc adjustment clauses. They have opened 
regulatory decisionmakmg to consumer mterests by makmg mfor­
matIon available and allowmg full partIcIpatIOn m vanous proceed­
mgs. Title r s Impact m other less progressIve junsdictIons, how­
ever, cannot be dismIssed lightly The State of MISSISSIPPI and its 
Public ServIce CommISSIOn, for example, challenged the enactment 
of PURPA on constitutIonal grounds. 6 TheIr complamt, jomed by 
the MISSISSIppI Power & LIght Company claIms that the reqUIred 
heanngs and mformatIon gathenng procedures create an unconstI­
tutIonal burden on the state and usurp the mherent powers of the 
state to regulate mtrasta[e utilitIes. 7 Although the complamt may 
not be meritonous, it mdicates the concern expressed by the less 
progressIve regulatory authoritIes and utilitIes. ThIs concern rem­
forces the opportunity whICh PURPA proVIdes for consumers to 
challenge eXIstmg energy regulatIon. 
Title I IS partIcularly pertment to "nonregulated utilitIes."8 
For many such utilitIes, notably mUnICIpal systems, PURPA may 
represent the first effort at regulatIon by other than a local legisla­
5. Title I, Retail Regulatory PoliCies for ElectriC Utilities, deals exclUSively 
with electriC utilities and their consumers. 
6. MiSSISSIPPI Federal Energy Regulatory Comm n, No. J79-0212 (S.D. Miss., 
filed Apr. 24, 1979). 
7 Amended Complamt of plamtiff. 
8. These nonregulated electriC utilities mclude all utilities not regulated by 
state regulatory authority or the Tennessee Valley Authority 16 U.S.C.A. § 2602(9), 
(17), (18) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). In addition, nonregulated electriC utilities must 
be of suffiCient size with annual sales of 500 million kilowatt-hours or more. Id. § 
2612(a). While difficult to generalize, company of 500 million kilowatt-hours m 
sales probably represents utility servmg population of roughly 50,000. ThiS repre­
sents reSidential, commerCial, and mdustrlal customers. 
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tIve body While regulatIon by the local legIslatures may make sys­
tems responsIve to local needs, such legIslatures usually lack the 
necessary expertIse and tIme to provIde adequate oversIght. Title I 
reqUIres open proceedings and written deCISIOns with regard to 
PURPA concerns, thereby permittIng public scrutmy and con­
sumer mput mto the declSlonmakmg process, often for the first 
tIme. 9 
The Act reqUIres the Secretary of DOE10 to publish an 
updated list each year of those electnc utilitIes subject to title I. 11 
From thIs list, each state must Identify the utilitIes over whICh it 
has junsdictIon. While not stated explicitly m the Act, the legIsla­
tIve hIstory mdicates that the failure to mclude a partIcular utility 
on the appropnate list does not excuse it or any regulatory author 
ity that has junsdictIon over it from compliance with title 1.12 If a 
partIcular utility IS omitted from the list but should not have been, 
consumers should mSIst on compliance by that utility and the ap­
propnate state authOrity 
III. TITLE I's AGENDA 
A. Purposes 
Title I of PURPA IS mtended to encourage conservatIon, effi­
CIency and equity m the supply and use of electnc energy 13 The 
9. All electriC utilities, both regulated and nonregulated, with retail sales 
greater than 500 million kilowatt-hours annually are covered by the reqUirements of 
title I. The only exception IS, however, that the operations of an electric utility 
relating to wholesale sales of electriC energy are not covered. Id. § 2612(b). These 
sales, to the extent regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory CommiSSIOn, are 
subject to some directives of other titles of the Act mcluding review of automatic ad­
Justment clauses by the Federal Energy Regulatory CommiSSIOn. Id. § 824d. If util­
ity has both wholesale and retail sales and the retail sales exceed the limit, coverage 
IS extended to mclude the retail portion of that utility. 
10. While the Act occasIOnally distingUishes between the Secretary and the De­
partment of Energy (DOE), for purpose of thiS diSCUSSion they are Identical and the 
two will be used mterchangeably. Id. § 261(c). 
11. The lists are made available by the state utility commiSSIOns or the Depart­
ment of Energy. The first such list was published on March 21, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 
17,447 (1979). 
12. "It should be stressed that the list IS mformational and for the convemence 
of the public, but IS not mtended m any way to affect the legal obligation of any util­
ity, or state regulatory commiSSIOn with regard to any utility. H.R. CONF REP 
No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102, at 70 (1978), repnnted In [1978] 6 V.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7804 [heremafter cited as H.R. CONF REP.]. 
13. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2611 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The followmg diSCUSSIOn, ex­
cept where expressly noted, refers to electriC utilities and regulation of them exclu­
Sively. 
30 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:25 
conservatIon purpose IS directed at the ultImate end user of elec­
tncity 14 EfficIency however, IS directed at electnc utilitIes and it 
pertams to the efficIent use of "facilitIes and resources."15 The 
Conference Report specifically mcludes capital resources withm the 
meanmg of resources. 1S Presumably a utility should undertake 
conservatIon programs utilizmg relatively small amounts of capital 
before it commits large capital resources to building additIonal 
generatIng plants. The Report states that efficIent use mcludes 
conservmg scarce energy resources by rate reform whICh sub­
stitute[s] the use[s] of more plentiful [domestIc] resources m 
heu of less plentiful resources, especIally those Imported "17 
ThIS may not necessarily mean, for example, that coal should re­
place oil fired base load plants. Rather, it may mean that rates 
should be restructured to encourage less usage of oil or natural gas 
dunng peak generatIon hours. Usage should be shifted to the off 
peak hours when coal fired base load plants are utilized. 18 The eq­
uity purpose relates to equitable rates among different consumers 
and does not refer to balancmg the equity between consumers and 
the return to stockholders or to other notIons of a balance between 
rates and utility profits. 
The Conference Report makes clear that mtervenors argumg 
for a partICular actIon should carefully demonstrate that theIr pro­
posal furthers at least one purpose without producmg other adverse 
effects. For example, if a partIcular rate structure IS bemg offered 
on the grounds of equity to consumers, it should also be made 
clear that its adoptIon will not adversely affect conservatIon. It 
need not be shown, however, that the rate structure encourages 
conservatIon m additIon to achIevmg equity 19 
14. H.R. CONF REP., supra note 12 § 101, at 70, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797,7804. 
15. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
16. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 101, at 70, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7804. 
17. Id. at 69, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 7803. 
18. The DOE In its first Intervention under PURPA cited thiS language to sup­
port the completion of the Millstone III Nuclear Plant In Connecticut. Prefiled Testi­
mony of DaVid S. Bardin at 4, Rate Increase of Connecticut Power & Light, No. 
781206 (Conn. Div. of Pub. Utility Control, filed Feb. 8, 1979). While thiS comple­
tion may result In greater use of domestic sources of energy to replace foreign oil, it 
does not utilize rate reform to accomplish thiS end. It would appear, therefore, that 
DOE' clrumed grounds for Intervention and testimony In the Millstone III construc­
tion schedule IS Improper. 
19. A good illustration of thiS example IS found In recent District of Columbia 
deCISIOn. Proceeding to Consider Establishment of Time of Day Peak Load Pnclng 
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Most Importantly title r s purposes supplement otherwIse ap­
plicable state law 20 and they do not overnde state law 21 State law 
regarding electnc utility rates often reqUITes no more than that 
they be Just and reasonable. Consequently state regulatory author 
itIes contend, m some mstances, that while they can control the 
revenue level achIeved by a utility theIr authority on rate deSIgn 
IS mmimal. In such states, the Act's three purposes will Illsure that 
regulatory authoritIes have the statutory authority to go beyond 
revenue consIderatIons and become fully mvolved m all aspects of 
utility regulatIon. 
Similarly states may use the supplementary authority pro­
VIded by PURPA to address the nonrate deSIgn standards of sectIon 
2623. 22 For example, a regulatory authority that deSIred to prohibit 
ratepayers from bemg charged for politIcal and promotIonal adver 
tIsmg often shied away from such a prohibitIon, fearmg that there 
was no baSIS III state law for such an actIon. Now it would be able 
to cite PURPA23 and enact that prohibitIon. 
The Act's three purposes of conservatIOn, effiCIency and eq­
uity are gIven further meanmg by SIX ratemakmg standards24 and 
four regulatory standards. 25 
for Large Demand Customers of Potomac Elec. Power Co., No. 680 (D.C. Public 
Service CommissIOn, June 28, 1979). The PSC found that time of day rates for large 
commercial customers would foster equity among such users by havmg rates track 
the cost of providing electricity at different times of the day While the CommissIOn 
found that conservation may also be fostered by thiS rate reform, it based its deCISIOn 
pnnclpally on equity and on finding that conservation would not be adversely af­
fected. 
20. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2621(a), 2623(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
21. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § lIl, at 71 repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7805. In that same section the report also states: 
The mtent here IS that where State regulatory authority or nonregulated 
utility finds msufficlent authority, pursuant to otherwise applicable State 
law, under whICh it may adopt standard then these three purposes of 
the title proVide such authority. In effect, the three purposes expand the dis­
cretion of the State regulatory authority or nonregulated utility to adopt the 
standards 
Id. § 113, at 75, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 7809. 
22. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
23. Id. § 2623(b)(5). 
24. Id. § 2621. 
25. Id. § 2623. There are five regulatory standards. The fifth one, however, re­
garding procedures to be met pnor to termmation of service IS treated differently. Id. 
§ 2623(b)(4). It IS to be considered by regulatory authorities and nonregulated utili­
ties without regard to the furtherance of the three purposes. Id. § 2623(a)(2). As the 
Conference Report stated, "[t]he conferees treated termmation of service differently 
from the other standards m thiS section because the provIsIOn IS generally not related 
to these purposes but IS an Important provIsion to protect consumers from mappro­
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B. Ratemaktng Standards 
Ratemakmg standards are established m two sectIons of the 
Act26 and are mtegrated with the Act's purposes. 27 Because of theIr 
Importance, each of the standards IS set out below 
1. Rates for each class of customer shall be designed to the 
maximum extent practicable to reflect the cost of providing 
serVIce to that class. 28 While settmg a cost IS left to the state 
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility it must account for 
the difference m cost attributable to daily and seasonal time of 
serVice, the particular customer, demand, and energy compo­
nents. 29 
2. Unless cost Justified, the pnce of the rate s energy component 
or that portion of the rate attributable to the energy cost, may 
not decline as consumption mcreases. 30 This standard does not 
relate to the entIre rate, Just the energy component. 31 It would 
be possible for a declimng block rate32 to meet thiS standard if 
the pnce of the energy component were held constant but the 
customer and demand component declined as consumption m­
creased. In thiS case, the customer would still face a declirnng 
block rate structure when the rate m its entirety was considered. 
3. Rates shall be based upon the time of day when the energy IS 
used, if such rates can be cost Justified. 33 The cost IS measured 
by companng the long run benefits-lower fuel and generatmg 
costs34_to metermg and other customer costs associated with 
such a rate deSign. If the former exceeds the latter, then such 
rates are cost Justified. 
pnate tenmnation of servlCe. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § ll3, at 76, repnnted 
In [1978) 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7810. For these reasons it will be 
treated separately here. 
26. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2621(d), 262S(a)-(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
27. "The conferees IOtend that thiS consideration will focus on how Implemen­
tation of each standard would affect each utility and its consumers 10 terms of the 
three purposes set forth 10 Section 101. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § lll, at 
70, repnnted In [1978) 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7804 (emphaSIS 
added). 
28. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
29. ld. § 2625(a). 
30. ld. § 2621(d)(2). 
31. An energy component" IS that portion of the rate deSigned to recover the 
cost of the fuel used to produce electrIcity For example, if oil IS used to produce 
electricity the energy charge for each kilowatt-hour IS deSigned to cover the cost of 
oil necessary to produce that kilowatt-hour. 
32. A declin10g block IS rate deSign 10 whlCh discounts are given for 
10creasmg usage so that the cost per unit of energy decreases as use 1Ocreases. 
33. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
34. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § llS, at 78, repnnted In (1978) 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7812. 
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4. Rates must vary with the season to the extent that the utility 
mcurs different costs III different seasons. 35 
5. Cost Justified mterruptible rates must be offered to all com­
mercIal and mdustnal customers. 36 
6. A utility must offer its consumers practIcal, cost effectIve, and 
reliable load management techmques if they aSSIst a utility m 
managmg energy and/or capacity reqUIrements. 37 In order to be 
cost effectIve the techmque must provIde net long run cost 
savmgs as reqUIred for time of day rates and be likely to reduce 
the utility s peak demand. 38 
c. Regulatory Standards 
Regulatory standards may only mdirectly affect the rate struc­
ture. 39 They still, however, must meet the test of furthenng at 
least one of the Act's purposes. As with the ratemakmg standards, 
the Importance of the regulatory standards warrants settmg them 
out below 
1. Master metenng IS prohibited In new buildings if the occu­
pants can control a portIOn of theIr own electnc usage and the 
benefits to such occupants exceed the additIOnal costs of IndiVId­
ual meters. 40 
2. An automatic adjustment clause IS only permitted if it IS 
found to encourage effiCIent use of resources and to msure maxI­
mum economIes In those operatIons and purchases subject to 
such a clause. 41 Audits and reports of utilitIes utilizIng such 
clauses are permitted although not reqUired. 42 
3. Each utility must penodically supply eXIsting rate schedules 
to each customer. 7hese schedules must contam the utilities en­
tire rate structure for all customers.43 In additIon, proposed rate 
schedules affecting specific consumers must be supplied to them 
35. 	 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
36. Id. § 2621(d)(5). 
37. Id. § 2621(d)(6). 
38. Id. § 2625(c). 
39. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 113, at 75, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7809. 
40. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
41. Id. § 2623(b)(2), (e)(I). 
42. Id. § 2625(e)(2). 
Significantly, the Conference Report made it explicit that such clauses, if they 
met procedural reqUIrements, were not encouraged" nor considered to be "inappro­
pnate. The Report went on to state that cost of service mdexmg, as used m New 
MeXICO, should not be barred. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 115, at 79-80, re
pnnted tn [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797 7813-14. 
43. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2623(b)(3), 2625(f)(I), (2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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withIn thIrty or In some cases, SIXty days after application or 
proposal for a change In the rate schedule.44 Upon a consumer s 
request, the utility must also supply mformatIon relating to that 
consumer s consumption for the pnor year. 45 
4. The costs of promotional and political advertisIng can only be 
recovered from shareholders or other owners of a utility 46 There 
are no restnctions, however, on the amount or cost of such ad­
vertIsIng. 47 Both promotional and political advertismg are 
broadly defined. 48 There are five exceptions to these definitions. 
The costs of advertismg related to these can be charged to rate­
payers. 49 Unlike most states that have adopted sImilar statutes or 
regulations, thIs statute permits mstitutional advertIsIng to be 
charged to ratepayers. 50 
The standards discussed need not be totally accepted. The leg­
IslatIve hIstOry of title I mdicates that modifymg a standard may be 
appropnate. 51 The Conference Report explams, for example, that it 
may be appropnate to adapt a standard to fit local conditIons. 
"AdoptIon of standards whICh vary mSIgnificantly from the 
standards spelled out m thIS sectIon may be treated as adoption of 
the standards "52 If the standard adopted does vary more than 
mSIgnificantly from the standard set forth m the legIslatIOn, then 
that vanatIon will not be consIdered an adoptIon of the standard. It 
will be Important to establish that there was a failure to adopt the 
44. [d. §§ 2623(b)(3), 2625(f)(I)(B). 
45. [d. §§ 2623(b)(3), 2625(f)(3). 
The Conference Report also suggests that the first notice regarding rates to con­
sumers could also Illclude listing of hiS nghts and responsibilities H.R. 
CONF REP supra note 12 § US, at SO, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 7797, 7814. 
46. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
47 H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § U5, at 80, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7814. 
48. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2625(h)(I)(B), (C) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
49. [d. § 2625(h)(2). 
50. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 115, at 80, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7814. 
51. The Conference Report states explicitly' 

The conferees expect that the modifications of the standards described III 

thiS section may meet the test of appropnateness III the context of particu­

lar potential application. The conferees therefore understand that Illdivldual 

States (or utilities) may choose to adapt the standards to their particular situ­

ation as documented III the record of the heanng held to examille the 

standard. 

[d. at 76, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 7810. 
52. [d. at 77, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 7811. 
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standard if, at the same hme, there IS failure to comply with the 
procedural reqUIrements of sectIon 2623{c).53 
D Procedures Regarding Termmation of Sermce to Consumers 
In additIon to rate and regulatory standards, the PURPA 
agenda reqUIres specific procedures for termmatmg electrIc servIce 
to consumers. 54 The statute55 and legIslahve hIstory expressly pro­
vIde that termmatIon procedures are to be adopted without regard 
to the Impact the procedures may have on the Act's purposes of 
conservahon, efficIency and equity The test for adoptmg termma­
hon procedures IS restncted to whether they would be appropn­
ate and consIstent with otherwIse applicable state law "56 
The statute expressly prOVIdes that when consIdenng termma­
hon procedures, the Act's three purposes are conSIdered to be a 
supplement to state law 57 ThIS appears to be mconsIstent with the 
statement of the Conference Report that termmatIon procedures 
are not related" to the purposes. 58 Despite the mconsIstency it 
may prove to be Important m convmcmg a regulatory authority or 
unregulated utility to adopt termmahon procedures. 
If there IS no specific statutory authonzahon for adoptIon of 
termmatlOn procedures m a partICular state, then the regulatory 
authority or nonregulated utility may take the positIon that it can­
not, as a matter of law prescribe such restnctIons on the termma­
tIon of customers. If, however consumers can show that such re­
stnctIons on termmatIons achIeve one of the purposes of title I, 
they could argue that smce these purposes supplement state law 
they prOVIde the necessary statutory authority upon whICh to base 
the promulgatIon of termmatIon procedures. The mam purpose 
achIeved by such procedures IS equity thereby msunng that con­
sumers are faIrly treated and not termmated before bemg gIven an 
opportunity to dispute the reasons or to pay m mstallments. There 
are at least two contrary arguments, however, whICh may confront 
the consumers. The first argument IS that the adoptIon of termma­
tIon procedures will adversely affect conservatIon because those 
who get somethmg for nothmg will waste it. Also, there IS the eq­
53. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
54. Id. § 2623(b)(4). 
55. Id. § 2623(a)(2). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. § 2623(a). 
58. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 113, at 76, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7810. 
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uity argument that one consumer should not be gIVen more time to 
pay a bill than another consumer 
The termmation procedures stated m section 2625(g)59 provIde 
two major protections for consumers. They reqUIre pnor notice and 
an opportunity to dispute the reason for termmatIon, and a limita­
tion on termmatIon m certam hardshIp cases. The pnor notice 
must mclude a clear and conCIse statement of the nghts and reme­
dIes available to the consumer 60 The reasonable opportunity to 
dIspute may mclude a hearmg or a less formal procedure, but it 
must allow the consumer an effectIve opportunity to dispute those 
reasons"61 for termmatIOn. 
TermmatIons are restncted m cases where the regulatory au­
thority or the nonregulated utility determmes that termmatIon 
would be especIally dangerous to health, "62 or if an occupant IS 
elderly or handicapped63 even if that occupant IS not the consumer 
but IS only "someone m the household."64 In such cases, termma­
tIon IS prohibited if the consumer IS only able to pay for servIce m 
mstallments rather than one lump sum as normally reqUIred. 65 As 
with other regulatory standards, some adaptation of the procedures 
to fit local conditIOns may be allowed. Depending upon the relatIve 
strength of the different mterests and the VIew of the regulatory 
authority m a partIcular locality some weakenmg of the statutory 
safeguards could result. For example, the standard prohibits termI­
nations if such would be espeCIally dangerous to health. The pre­
CIse definition of the term dangerous IS left to the vanous Junsdic­
tIons. In a JunsdictIon where there IS a narrow definition, the 
standard may be rendered less meanmgful. 
E. Ltfeline Rates 
The last item on the PURPA agenda IS lifeline rates. 66 Lifeline 
59. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2625(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
60. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 115, at 80, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7814. 
61. ld. 
62. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2625(g)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
63. ld. 
64. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 115, at 80, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7814. 
65. No provIsiOn IS made for the consumer who fits this hardship descnption 
but IS unable to pay even In Installments. Presumably it would be permissible to ter­
minate this consumer as well as one who agreed to pay In Installments but failed to 
do so. 
66. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2624 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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IS treated apart from the other ratemakmg standards of section 
262167 m order to msure that such rates are permitted, although 
not reqmred, as an excepbon to the standard regarding cost based 
rates m section 2621(d)(I).68 It permits rates lower than those that 
would meet a cost of servIce test to account for certam essential 
needs of resIdential consumers.69 The legIslation IS mtended to em­
phasIze that lifeline rates are permitted and to msure that an op­
portunity to examme thIs rate form IS provIded. It neither encour 
ages nor discourages such a rate, but leaves conSIderation of it up 
to the state regulators or nonregulated utility 
IV PURPA PROCEDURE 
Each of the agenda items prevlOusly discussed reqmres a hear 
mg by state regulatory authorities or nonregulated utilities, and 
each reqmres that determmatIons be made m writmg. Procedural 
differences do eXIst, however and it IS Important to understand 
those differences m order to make full use of PURPA. The 
discusslOn that follows exammes these sImilarities and differences 
m each step of the PURPA procedure from the mitIatlOn of a hear 
mg to the rendermg of a declSlon. 
A. Time Lfmftatwns 
PURP A reqmres that conSIderation of the Act's agenda be 
commenced no later than November 9, 1980, whICh IS two years 
from enactment of the legislatlOn. The term commencement, how­
ever, vanes for the different parts of the agenda. 
1. Ratemaktng Standards 
Section 2622(b)(1)70 reqmres that conSIderatIon of the rate­
makmg standards be commenced, or a heanng date for such com­
mencement be set, withm two years of enactment. The heanng 
need not conclude nor even begm withm the two year penod as 
long as the date for such commencement of conSIderatIon IS set be­
fore the two years expIre. Although the two year limit only re­
67 Id. § 2621. 
68. Id. § 2621(d)(1). 
69. Arguments for lifeline type rates have been advanced on the grounds that 
such rates are cost Justified. T the extent these arguments are found compelling, the 
special exception proVISIOn of thiS section IS .superfluous. The statute, however, 
reqUires special hearing to be held. Id. § 2624(b). ThiS factor should still prove 
useful. 
70. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2622(b)(l) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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qUIres the commencement of consIderation or the settmg of a hear 
mg date, the consIderation must be completed and the 
determmatIon made with respect to the standards withm three 
years from enactment, by November 9, 1981. 71 A state regulatory 
authority or nonregulated utility that delays beyond the time pre­
scribed, however, suffers little penalty It IS only reqUIred to un­
dertake the consIderation of the standards and to make the deter­
mmatIon for a covered utility m the first rate proceeding 
commenced concernmg the utility after the three year limit has ex­
prred. 72 
The vIability of even the weak penalty that IS mandated may 
be illusory The penalty reqUIres that the relevant consIderatIOn be 
made m the first rate proceeding commenced after the three year 
penod has run its course. The Act does not define "commence." If 
it merely means that the utility files a notice of mtent to file for a 
rate proceeding, then such a filing could be made Just before the 
expIration of the three year limit, with the actual filing months 
away Since the proceeding techmcally commenced before the ex­
prratIon of the three year penod, the consIderation of the 
ratemakmg standards would not have to be made dunng that pro­
ceeding. It may have to wait for the next rate proceeding whICh 
may not begm for several years. 
Furthermore, the Act does not define proceeding." If read 
narrowly the term "first rate proceeding could exclude all but a 
formal, full blown rate case. A delay of several years mIght occur if 
rate mcreases can be made on an mtenm baSIS without a heanng 
by the legIslative body of a mumcipality 
Finally there IS no mterpretatIon of the reqUIrement that con­
sIderation and determmatIon must be made "in the first rate pro­
ceeding. Query whether a regulatory authority could bifurcate a 
rate proceeding, make a deCISIon m the first phase on the revenue 
level questIOn whICh IS the paramount concern of a utility and 
subsequently consIder the question of the ratemakmg standards. 
ThIS tactic could delay the determmatIon of the standards for years. 
71. Id. § 2622(b)(2). 
72. Id. § 2622(b)(3). 
Such penalty IS far less severe than the penalties that eXist In other areas of 
federal legislation where state IS reqUired to take certain procedural steps. The cut­
off of federal funds for the failure to enact State Implementation Plan (SIP) under 
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West Supp. 1978), or the demal of all federal 
highway momes for the failure to enforce truck weight laws are two examples of the 
greater clubs that could be Wielded. 23 U.S.C.A § 127 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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Yet, the approach apparently would be withm the statutory re­
qUirements for makmg the determmatIon "in the proceeding. 73 
These eventualitIes would Vlolate legIslatIve mtent to consIder ex­
peditIously the ratemakmg standards. 74 They appear, however, to 
be possible outcomes. 
Fortunately there may be opportunitIes to aVOid undue delay 
of consIderatIon of the ratemakmg standards by forcmg a consIdera­
tIon through sectIon 2622(a).75 ThIS sectIon authonzes any mter­
venor m a rate proceeding to request and reqUire the regulatory 
authority or nonregulated utility to consIder and make the re­
quested determmatIon with respect to the ratemakmg standards. 
The determmatIon must then be made m the rate proceeding m 
questIon. If, however, there IS a pending or Immediately upcom­
mg rate proceeding and if it appears that the regulatory authority 
or nonregulated utility may delay consIderatIon of the standards, 
Immediate mitIatIon may provIde some relief from that expected 
delay 
2. Regulatory Standards 
With regard to the regulatory standards of sectIon 2623,76 the 
tImmg problem IS less severe. SectIons 2623(a) and (C)77 reqUire 
notIce and heanng. Either adoptIOn or a written determmation not 
to adopt all or any of the standards and the reasons must be made 
by November 9, 1980. Any maneuvenng to delay will not be suc­
cessful smce a declSlon as well as conSIderatIOn must be made by 
the set deadline. Unfortunately short of JudiCIal reVIew as author 
lzed m section 2633,78 there IS no remedy for noncompliance with 
thIS time reqUirement. There IS no explicit proVIsIon sImilar to sec­
tion 2622(c)79 whICh states the consequence of a failure to comply 
73. The Connecticut DPUC did Just that m Docket No. 781206. See note 18 su­
pra. The first phase decided June 29, 1979, adjusted the revenue level. The second 
phase of the proceeding did not even start until July 1979. In this second phase 
PURPA Issues will be discussed. The rule of § 2622(c) cannot be mvoked smce the 
three years have not run. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2622(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). If state IS 
subject to thiS rule m the future, however, by havmg failed to make determmation 
withm three years, the state may be able to aVOId havmg to make the deCISIOn mdef­
mitely by employmg the ruse of bifurcated process. 
74. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 74, repnnted an [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7808. 
75. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2622(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
76. Id. § 2623. 
77. Id. § 2623(a), (c). 
78. Id. § 2633. 
79. Id. § 2622(c). 
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Furthermore, mtervenor mitIated consIderatIOn m a pending rate 
proceeding as was permitted m the ratemakmg standards of sectIon 
262180 IS not authonzed. 81 
3. 	 Ltfeline Rates 
The tImmg reqmrement of lifeline rates also lacks clarity For 
every electnc utility that does not have a lifeline rate m effect by 
the deadline, there must be held an eVIdentIary heanng to deter 
mme if such a rate should be Implemented.82 Unfortunately there 
IS no tIme limit by whICh such a hearmg must be held or a deter 
mmatIon made. 83 
The legIslatIve hIstory gIves no gmdance about thIs tIme limit. 
If an electnc utility fails to meet the deadline, then the hearmg 
and declSlon apparently could be delayed mdefinitely ThIS appears 
contrary to the legtslatIve mtent and would nullify any reason for 
ongmally mcluding the deadline. Therefore, JudiCIal reVIew ap­
pears to be the only recourse if a lifeline heanng or determmatIon 
IS delayed mdefinitely Two arguments to support JudiCIal reVIew 
can be made. First, a delay beyond two years IS contrary to the 
legIslatIve mtent. Second, it IS only by reading mto the statute 
some reasonable tIme limit .on holding a hearmg and makmg a de­
tennmatIon that any meanmg or use can be ascribed to the two 
year language of the statute. 
B. 	 Commencement of a PURPA Heanng 
As with the tIme limitatIon, a PURPA proceeding can be mitI­
ated m several ways by several types of persons. Such mitIatIon, 
however, depends, to an extent, on the sectIon of the PURPA 
agenda to be addressed. 
80. 	 Id. § 2621. 
81. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 113, at 75, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7809. 
82. 	 16 U.S.C.A. § 2624(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
83. In fact, from the statutory language, it could be mferred that heanng held 
pnor to the expiration of the two year penod would not meet the reqUirements of 
thiS section. The Conference Report, however, does state that it IS "intend[ed] that 
the heanng be held after the date of enactment of thiS legislation and pnor proceed­
mgs held before that time not be referenced as complymg with these reqUirements. 
H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § 114, at 77 repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 7797, 7811 (emphasis added). Presumably, therefore, proceeding tak­
mg place after the date of enactment, but before the expiration of two years, would 
comply. 
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1. Ratemakmg Standards 
The procedure for mitIatmg a heanng on sectIOn 262184 
ratemakmg standards IS the most flexible. It can be mitIated by the 
state regulatory authority or nonregulated utility or by DOE or, m 
certam cIrcumstances, by other mtervenors. 
If mitIated by the state regulatory authority or nonregulated 
utility the only statutorily Imposed reqUIrement IS that the consId­
eratIon be preceded by public notIce and a heanng. 85 The 
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility can mitIate a new pro­
ceeding specifically deSIgned to consIder the ratemakmg standards 
or can undertake its consIderation m "any proceeding respectmg 
the rates of the electnc utility "86 If an eXIsting proceeding has al­
ready begun, no additional notice IS reqUIred "if there was ade­
quate pnor notice to appnse persons that the Issues may be 
raIsed. "87 In thIs proceeding anyone, or all, of the section 262188 
standards can be consIdered. 
Although there are no additional federal reqUIrements 
Imposed on state regulatory authorities or nonregulated utilities 
pnor to commencement of sectIOn 262189 consIderations, the Act 
specifically reqUIres that to the extent state law IS not mconsistent 
with the statute, such state procedural reqUIrements shall be 
controlling. 9o If state law IS mcohsistent, the federal procedure 
overndes those mconsistent sections. For example, a state law pro­
VIding that no notice IS reqUIred, or makmg no prOVISIon for such 
notice, before a nonregulated utility undertakes the consIderation 
of section 262191 standards would be overndden by the statute. A 
state law that provIded that notIce be gIven by a certam penod 
84. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
85. Id § 2621(b)(I). 
86. Id. § 2622(a). 
87. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § 112, at 74, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7808. 
ThIs statement IS taken from that section of the Conference Report whICh dis­
cusses heanngs Initiated by other than the regulatory authority or nonregulated util­
ity. It would appear, however, to apply here as well. There IS no reason to proVIde 
for additional notice In one situation and not In the other. A regulatory deCISIOn to 
undertake PURPA questions IS more likely to get publicity without additional notice 
than through the motIon of an Intervenor. 
88. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
89. [d. 
90. [d. § 2621(b)(2). 
91. [d. § 2621(d). 
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pnor to the commencement of the consIderatIon, or that reqUIred 
preheanng conferences, would remam m effect. 
A conslderatIon of sectIon 262192 standards may also be mitI­
ated by persons other than the state regulatory· authority or 
nonregulated utility These other persons, however, cannot mitIate 
a new proceeding. They can only mitIate the consIderatIon and re­
celve a determmatIon on section 262193 standards if a "proceeding 
respectmg the rates of the electnc utility" has already begun. 94 
The Conference Report makes it clear that the person' requestmg 
the consIderation of sectIon 2621 standards can raIse any or all of 
them. 95 Although the conferees clearly had rate cases m mmd 
when they permitted "any proceeding respectmg rates" to become 
PURPA proceedings,96 the language of the statute appears broader 
Almost any proceeding before a state regulatory authority could fit 
withm the rubnc of "a proceeding respectmg rates," mcluding but 
not limited to those mvolvmg fuel adjustment charges, Issuance of 
securitIes, expansIOn of franchIse territory load forecast, and gen­
eratIon or transmISSIon sitmg. Presumably anyone of these could 
become a PURPA proceeding although additIonal notIce probably 
would be reqUIred. 
Any partICIpant or mtervenor can mitIate conslderatIon of sec­
tIon 262197 standards m an eXlstmg proceeding. 98 Although the 
Conference Report refers to partIes and mtervenors,99 the term 
"partIcIpant" IS generally consIdered broader than party" and be­
cause it IS explicitly con tamed m the statute, the broader wording 
would apply Such persons would mclude the electnc utility whICh 
IS the subject of the hearmg as well as other mtervenors. 
Intervenors mclude, m additIon to anyone permitted to mtervene 
pursuant to state law' The Secretary of DOE, any affected electnc 
utility or any customers of such an affected utility 100 "Affected 
utility" IS broadly construed to mclude any utility regulated by the 
92. ld. 
93. ld. 
94. ld. § 2622(a). See also H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 74, re­
pnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 7797, 7808. 
95. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 74, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797,7808. 
96. ld. (reference IS made to delay III the rate proceeding process). 

97 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 

98. ld. § 2622. 
99. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 74, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 7797, 7808. 
100. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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same regulatory authority whICh may be "affected by precedents 
set m a case relatmg to another utility "101 Thus, thIs sectIon gtves 
the nght of mterventIon and the ability to mitiate the sectIon 
2621102 consIderation to customers of a state regulated utility m 
proceedings regarding the rates of any other utility regulated by 
the same state if anythmg relevant to the ratemakmg standards IS 
to be consIdered. 
Section 2631(a)1°3 appears to permit mterventIon by section 
2631104 parties and subsequent consIderation of ratemakmg stan­
dards at any time while a proceeding IS still open. The section, 
however, reqUires that mterventIOn "be timely under otherwIse ap­
plicable law "105 if the proceeding began but was not completed 
pnor to enactment of the Act. Presumably applicable law mcludes 
state law whICh normally reqUires mterventIon at the outset of a 
proceeding or at least early In the life of a proceeding. The Confer­
ence Report Implies that Intervention after commencement of the 
proceeding IS to be permitted. 106 The Report specifically states: 
"[I]nterventIon [Is] to be mterpreted broadly to mclude mterven­
tIon or partiCIpation at the begInnmg of a proceeding or otherwtse 
"107 The conflict may be reconciled by restnctmg section 
2632(c)108 to its platn meamng. ThIS would result In its applicatIon 
to proceedings begun but not completed pnor to the enactment of 
the Act. Therefore, for any proceeding begun before November 9, 
1978, mterventIon must be tImely as defined by state law For pro­
ceedings begun after that date, state or other applicable law must 
Yield to the Act. 109 Intervention as a nght will be permitted and 
conSIderation of section 2621110 standards will be allowed if re­
quested at any time dunng a proceeding that has not yet been 
completed. 111 
101. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § 121, at 82, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7816. 
102. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
103. Id. § 2631(a). 
104. Id. § 2631. 
105. Id. § 2631(c). 
106. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 74-75, repnnted m [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7816. 
107. Id. § 121, at 82, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 
7816. 
108. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2632(c)( (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
109. Id. § 2621(b)(2). 
110. Id. § 2621. 
Ill. Id. §§ 2622(a), 2634. A cautionary note, both § 2622(a) and § 2634 may pre­
clude full consideration of standard if such consideration has already taken place. 
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2. Regulatory Standards 
The procedural framework for the commencement of a heanng 
to consIder section 2623112 standards IS substantially less complex 
than that for a section 2621113 heanng. It IS, however, more diffi­
cult for consumers to control the tImmg of such a heanng. There IS 
no clear statutory authority permittmg anyone other than the 
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility to mitiate a proceeding 
respectmg the rates charged by an electnc utility Section 2631 
states that an mtervenor can mtervene and particIpate, as a matter 
of nght, many ratemakmg proceeding "in order to mitiate and 
partIcIpate m the consIderation of one or more of the standards es­
tablished by [s]ubchapter II "114 Because subchapter II m­
cludes both sections 2621115 and 2623,116 it appears that once a 
rate proceeding has begun, mtervenors can mitiate, as well as par 
tIclpate m, a conslderatlOn of both sections standards. While sec­
hon 2631 apparently provldes the reqUIsite statutory authority the 
vlability of thIS mterpretatIon IS questionable. 
First, there IS no specific authority117 grantmg the power of 
mitiatlOn with regard to the section 2623118 standards. Second, the 
leglslahve hIstory does not support the grantmg of such author 
ity 119 Because of these two factors, the nght to reqUIre consIdera­
tion of the sectIon 2623120 standards m ratemakmg proceedings ap­
pears doubtful. It IS clear, however, that the regulatory authority 
or nonregulated utility could, if it so chose, mclude such a consId­
eratIon m any proceeding, whether called specifically for that pur 
pose or not, as long as such consIderation IS permitted under oth­
erwtse applicable law Such law refers to both state law and the 
procedural reqUIrements of the Act such as adequate notIce. 
112. Id. § 2623(b). 
113. Id. § 2621. 
114. Id. § 2631(a). 
115. Id. § 2621. 
116. Id. § 2623. 
117 As distinct from the general diSCUSSIOn of the power of mtervenors con­
tamed m § 2631(a). 
118. Id. § 2623. As compared, for example, to § 2622(a) contammg § 2621 
standards. 
119. In its discusslOn of § 2623, the Conference Report states, "[t]hls section 
does not reqUIre State regulatory authority or nonregulated utility to undertake the 
conSideration of these standards as proVided m § 112(a) [§ 2622(a)] whenever an 
llltervenor or partiCipant raises them m any rate proceeding as proVided with respect 
to the standards set forth m § 111(d) [§ 2621(d)]. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 
111, at 76, repnnted III [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7810. 
120. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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3. Llfeline Rates 
Except for sectIon 2631(a)121 pertammg to who may commence 
lifeline rate consIderatIon, the statute and legIslatIve hIstory are SI­
lent. As previOusly discussed, sectIon 2631122 may provIde author 
ity for the mitIatIon of the consIderatIon of the Issue m any con­
vened ratemakmg proceeding. Such an mitIatIon, however, need 
not be honored by the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility 
until two years after enactment of the Act, and then only if a utility 
does not have a lifeline rate. 123 
C. Procedures for PURPA Proceedings 
In additIon to reqmrements concernmg notIce and mitIatIon of 
consIderatIon of the PURPA agenda, the Act addresses the ques­
tIon of hearmg procedures. It leaves much of thIs procedural re­
qmrement to state law 
The Act reqmres that a separate determmatIon for each item 
of the PURPA agenda be made for each utility covered by the 
Act. 124 PURPA IS silent on whether determmatIon must be made 
m a separate heanng for each utility or whether genenc125 heanngs 
can be held by a state regulatory authority The Conference Re­
port, however, expressly states that either genenc or mdividual 
proceedings are permitted m sectIon 2621126 consideratlOn. They 
may be distmct from rate case proceedings where revenue levels 
are determmed, but the nghts of mtervenors and other partIes 
must be the same as m rate cases. 127 If the genenc optIon IS cho­
sen, the standards still must be exammed and applied on a utility 
by utility baSiS. 128 
121. [d. § 2631(a). 
122. [d. § 2631. 
123. Of course, the notice and other procedural reqUirements of the statute 
must be met. 
124. [d. §§ 2621(a), 2623(a), 2624(b). 
125. "Genenc refers to the practice of some regulatory agencIes of holding 
one heanng at whICh all utilities withIn the agency Junsdiction are requIfed to ap­
pear and discuss common Issue affecting all of them. Any deCISIOn reached IS bInd­
Ing on each utility. In the past such procedure has been used to hear matters 
relating to rate deSIgn, accounting practices, and termInation procedures. 
126. [d. § 2621. 
127. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § Ill, at 72, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797 7806. 
128. [d. 
Given the descnption of affected" utility discussed above, it would appear that 
genenc heanngs are almost favored. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631(a) (West Cum. StIpp. 1979). 
If every utility concerned about precedent Involves itself In proceedings InvolVIng 
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No such gUIdance IS available with respect to proceedings for 
consIderatIon of sectIOn 2623129 standards and lifeline rates. Be­
cause of the general deferral to state procedural law however, it 
appears that if genenc heanngs are permitted under state law they 
could be utilized to consIder these standards as well. The caveat 
that exammatIon and applicatIon of the standards must be on a util­
ity by utility basIs would still be relevant. Apparently genenc pro­
ceedings are permitted to consIder common Issues and general 
theory but utility by utility exammatIon must be completed. 
Dunng the heanng process itself, with only a few albeit Im­
portant, exceptIons, state procedure IS controlling. ConSIderatIon of 
sectIons 2621130 and 2623131 standards must mclude a heanng. 
There IS, however no definitIon withm the Act of what constitutes 
the mmimal reqUIrements of a hearmg. SectIon 2631132 does pro­
vIde mtervenors with access to relevant mformatIon pursuant to 
state rules of discovery whICh IS a process normally associated with 
tnal type proceedings. But, there appears to be no guarantee m 
the Act that the hearmg must necessarily mclude such essentIal 
nghts as an opportunity to present eVIdence and cross-examme. 
There appears no bar, for example, m the federal legIslatIon to a 
state regulatory authority or nonregulated utility from meetIng the 
partIcIpatIon reqUIrements133 by merely allowmg the mtervenor or 
partIcIpant to gIVe a short statement and nothmg more. 
Some protectIon with regard to sectIon 2621134 standards may 
be afforded by state law SectIon 2621(b)(2)135 reqUIres that proce­
dures mandated by the state regulatory authority or nonregulated 
utility be followed except when they are mconsistent with the m­
terventIOn reqUIrements of sectIons 2622(a),136 2631,137 and 
2632.138 The Conference Report mcludes procedures governed by 
state law such as the nature of eVIdence, the relatIonshIp between 
every other utility and consumers of those utilities do likeWise, heanng that began 
as proceeding concemmg one utility may qUickly become genenc whether deSired 
by the regulatory authority or not. 
129. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
130. Id. § 2621. 
131. Id. § 2623. 
132. Id. § 2631(b). 
133. Id. § 2631. 
134. Id. § 2621. 
135. Id. § 2621(b)(2). 
136. Id. § 2622(a). 
137 Id. § 2631. 
138. Id. § 2632. 
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findings and the record, the burden of proof, and any other mat­
ters not mconslstent with the reqUIrements of thIs title. "139 Agam, 
these comments mdicate that a tnal type of admiDlstratIve heanng 
IS contemplated by the conferees. To the extent not reqUIred by 
state law however thIs section does not create that reqUIrement. 
Since VIrtually every state has established procedures that af­
ford at least mIDlmal protection, the fear concernmg less than com­
plete heanngs may be more Imagmed than real. For regulatory au­
thorities, thIS consIderation may be accurate. It must be remem­
bered, however, that nonregulated utilities, whICh prevIOusly set 
rates or made other declSlons merely by meetmgs of the directors, 
may not have established any procedures for conductmg heanngs. 
It IS clear that these nonregulated entities will have to provIde at 
least some opportunity for mtervenors to be heard. Unfortunately 
that opportunity may be little more than the opportunity to com­
ment. 
The concerns expressed over the lack of a clear reqUIrement 
for tnal type heanngs regarding standards for sections 2621140 and 
2623,141 are heIghtened by the fact that m requmng heanngs on 
lifeline rates the Act explicitly reqUIres eVIdentiary hearmgs. 142 
The section reqUIres open public heanngs, suffiCient notice, an op­
portunity to present eVIdence and cross-examme witnesses, deCI­
SIons based on the record, and JudiCIal reVieW 143 Clearly a tnal 
type hearmg with all necessary procedural safeguards IS contem­
plated. If the excluslOl44 rule of statutory construction IS applied to 
the two sections, it does not appear that adjudicatory heanngs 
were mtended for other than lifeline rates. Therefore, because of 
these mfirmitIes, attention must be paId to state law and proce­
139. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § HI, at 72, reprinted In [1978] 6 V.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7806. 
140. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
141. Id. § 2623. 
142. Id. § 2624(b). 
143. Id. § 2613(b)(A). 
Complete protection 10 the case of the nonregulated utility IS not prOVIded even 
by the reqUIrement smce § 2602(6)(C) only reqUIres that a proceeding conducted by 
an entity other than state or federal agency conforms to these reqUIrements "to the 
extent appropnate. Id. § 2602(6)(C). 
144. The expressw umus est exclusw altenus rule states that failure to mclude 
prOVISIOn 10 one part of statute while mcluding it elsewhere IS an mdication of 
legIslative mtent that it be omitted 10 the former and its omISSIOn was not mere over­
SIght. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 123 (4th ed. 
1973). 
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dural safeguards. They must be utilized if consumer partIclpatlOn 
m sectIons 2621145 and 2623146 hearmgs will be meamngful. 
D. Intervention tn PURPA Proceedings 
The Conference Report acknowledged the Importance of m­
tervenbon. 147 SectIon 2631148 of the Act grants authority to cer 
tam persons to mtervene many ratemakmg proceeding or other 
appropriate regulatory proceeding relatmg to rates or rate deSign, 
to partICIpate "in the conSideration of one or more of" sectIon 
2621(b) standards, section 2623(b) standards, or lifeline rates or 
other concepts whICh contribute to the achievement of the pur 
poses of thIS chapter that IS, conservation, effiCiency or equity 149 
ThIS last phrase IS construed broadly so that mterventIon will be al­
lowed without the reqUIrement of provmg a case m advance. 150 
Therefore, the nght to mtervene and partICIpate IS not tIed neces­
sarily to consideration of the standards or lifeline rates, but rather 
to the purposes of the title. ThIS IS broader than the PURPA 
agenda. It could mclude, for example, Issues such as the conserva­
tion program of a utility its management effiCiency or its method 
for ralSlng capital. 
Similarly partiCIpant" IS broadly defined. It mcludes not only 
the Secretary of DOE and consumers of the utility subject to the 
heanng, but also other utilitIes regulated by the same regulatory 
agency and theIr consumers. 151 When the proceeding mvolves 
rates or rate deslgn,152 or the mtervenor Wishes to discuss an Issue 
related to any of the purposes of title I, and the mtervenor fits the 
deSCriptIon of an affected utility or customer, then mterventIon and 
partICIpatIon must be allowed. 153 
145. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
146. Id. § 2623. 
147. "The conferees adopted thiS provISIon In recognition of the reliance they 
place on Intervention and partiCipation In these proceedings to further the purpose 
of thiS title. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 121, at 81, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7815. 
148. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
149. Id. § 2631(a). 
150. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 121, at 82, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7816. In fact, the Conference Report goes on to 
state that, "[a]ny Issue whICh may contribute to the purpose of the title should be 
gIVen consideration if it may contribute to these purposes. Id. 
151. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
152. The use of the phrase rates or rate deSign clearly Implies that the Issue 
could be either overall revenue level or the form of particular rates. 
153. ThiS nght must be exerCised, however, In timely manner. 
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While the nght to mtervene and particIpate IS broad, it IS not 
clear what type of permitted mterventIon and partICIpation will be 
most meanmgful. The degree of particIpation permitted mtervenors 
IS left largely to state law 154 There are exceptions for certam pro­
cedural nghts granted m eVIdentiary hearmgs related to lifeline 
rates155 and certam nghts to mformatIon. 156 In many Junsdictions, 
especIally those that have adopted a form of the AdmmistratIve 
Procedures Act (APA),157 the degree of partiCIpation permitted 
should be extenSIve. ThIS may not be true m all states and thus 
may prove to be a partIcularly nettlesome problem when dealing 
with nonregulated utilities. 
The nght to cross-examme witnesses, for example, except m 
lifeline rate hearmgs, IS not guaranteed by the federal legIslation. 
Therefore, if state law precludes thIS nght, the nght to submit eVI­
dence or the nght to present fully one s case, then the nght to m­
tervene may prove to be illusory Similarly the nght to obtam m­
formatIon158 appears to be broad. It gIVes all mtervenors access to 
all relevant mformatIon available to other partIes m the proceed­
mg, presumably mcluding the utility itself. Unfortunately thIS 
nght could be severely restncted if msufficIent opportunity to 
study the mformatlOn, or to rebut it, IS prOVIded. Therefore, while 
the Act may get an mtervenor mto the heanng process, state law 
will have to be relied upon to make that mterventIon worthwhile. 
E. PURPA Determmations 
In terms of substantive changes m rate deSIgn or utility prac­
tices, almost nothmg III title I IS mandatory It IS conceIvable that 
if a regulatory authority or nonregulated utility complies with pro­
cedural reqUlrements of title I, it can reject all the standards of 
section 2621,159 sechon 2623,160 and lifeline rates161 and still com­
ply with PURPA mandates. The grounds for makmg determmahons 
154. "The procedures for the type of Intervention are left to State law [al­
though] maxImum opportunity under State law to partiCIpate should be made avail­
able. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § 121, at 82, repnnted III U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 7797, 7816. 
155. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2624(b), 2602(6)(A)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
156. Id. § 2631(b). 
157 The Federal AdminIstrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-76 (1976) pro-
VIdes the baSIS for most state adminIstrative procedures acts. 
158. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
159. Id. § 2621. 
160. Id. § 2623. 
161. Id. § 2624(a). 
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with respect to the aforementIoned sectIons vary and must be dis­
cussed separately 
1. Ratemaktng Standards 
The threshold determmatIon for consIderatIon of each sectIon 
2621162 standard IS whether Implementation IS appropnate" for 
the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility "under otherwtse 
applicable state law "163 State law could either forbId Implementa­
tion, reqmre it or not discuss it. 
Followmg thIs determmatIon, it must be decIded for each sec­
tion 2621164 standard whether the Implementation of the standard 
IS appropnate to carry out the purposes of the title. 165 The crucIal 
word m both steps IS appropnate. Unfortunately no definitIon of 
the word IS found m the statute or legIslative hIstory Some gmd­
ance may be offered if the Secretary of DOE prescribes gmdelines 
pursuant to sectIon 2641166 or prOVIdes mformatIon pursuant to 
sectIon 2642. 167 U ntH such actIons are taken, the definitIon of ap­
propnate" IS left to regulatory authoritIes and nonregulated utili­
ties. 
It may be determmed that ImplementatIon of the standard 
would not be appropnate under state law If thIS IS the case, the 
deCISIon not to Implement must be made without regard to 
whether it would be appropnate to carry out one of the Act's pur 
poses. 16S As preVIOusly discussed, the purposes of PURPA are a 
supplement to, not an overnding of, state law The Conference Re­
port specifically states that when ImplementatIon of a standard IS 
found to be appropnate to carry out one of the purposes but IS m­
conSIstent with state law the state law governs and prevents the 
ImplementatIon of the standard. 169 
162. Id. § 2621. 
163. Id. § 2621{a). It IS clear that separate determInation must be made for 
each of the standards In § 2621{d). 
164. Id. § 2621. 
165. Id. § 2621{a). 
166. Id. § 2641. 
167. Id. § 2642. The Secretary of DOE Issued Notice of InqUIry on April 12, 
1979 soliciting comments regarding the establishment of such gUIdelines. 44 Fed. 
Reg. 22,022 (1979). Comments were to be filed by June 11, 1979. No deCISIon had 
been published at the time thIS article was prepared. 
168. It should be noted that InqUIry will still have to be made to determIne 
whether it would be so appropnate In order to comply with § 2621{c){2). ThIS section 
reqUIres that if Implementation of standard would be appropnate but it IS not done, 
then the reason for declinIng to do so must be stated In writing. Presumably, the 
only reason that need be gIven IS that it VIOlates state law. 
169. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § Ill, at 73, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
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If state law does not make ImplementatIon of a standard map­
propnate, and if one of the purposes will be achIeved by Imple­
mentatIon of the standard, then, because the purposes are a sup­
plement to state law ImplementatIOn of the standard "may be 
accomplished. 170 It must be emphaSIzed that ImplementatIon IS not 
reqUired by the Act although ImplementatIon m thIs CIrcumstance 
could be reqUired by state law 171 The mtentIon of the drafters "is 
to preserve the discretIon of the State regulatory authorities and 
nonregulated utilities whICh IS provIded by State law "172 There­
fore, if state law did not reqUire Implementation after a finding that 
such ImplementatIOn would be appropnate to meet one of the pur 
poses, then failure to so Implement would not constitute a VIOlatIon 
of thIS section smce thIS section does not reqUire Implementation of 
any standard. 173 
Relief IS possible under state law m the above CIrcumstance. 
No present state legIslatIOn reqUIres Implementation of a section 
2621 standard if found appropnate to achIeve conservation, effi­
CIency or equity In those states whIch have adopted some form of 
the APA, however, state law usually reqUIres that actIons of 
regulatory authoritIes or nonregulated utilities be based on deter 
mmatIons made on the record. Therefore, if it was determmed on 
the baSIS of the record that ImplementatIOn of a standard would be 
appropnate for achIevmg a purpose of the Act, the Implementation 
mIght be reqUIred. Failure to do so, without some other con­
travenmg determmatIon made on the record as well, would VIOlate 
state law whIch then could be enforced through JudicIal action. 
ThIS outcome IS unlikely and, therefore, relief under state law 
should not be expected. It IS difficult to Imagme that a regulatory 
authOrity would find a standard m conformity with state law and 
appropnate to achIeve a purpose of the Act and then fail to Imple­
ment it without also makmg some other contravemng determma­
tIon, based on the record, upon whICh to support its reJectIon. 
Most likely state law reqUires no more than that a detennmatIOn 
be based on the record, thereby allowmg broad discretion to the 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7807 See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 2627 (West Cum. Supp. 
1979). 
170. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
171. While Implementation IS not reqUIred by the Act, written determination 
and reason for failing to so Implement IS reqUIred, and failure to make public that 
writing does VIOlate federal law. [d. § 2621(c)(2). 
172. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § HI, at 71, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7805. 
173. [d. at 72, repnnted m [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 7806. 
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regulatory authority or nonregulated utility to consIder any factors 
deemed appropnate and to base a decISIon on any such factor 
whICh has a basIs m the record. In thIS cIrcumstance, the 
regulatory authority even if it rejected Implementation of a 
standard after finding that it would help achIeve one of the pur 
poses, would not be m vIOlation of state law if it also determmed 
that there were suffiCIent reasons on the record to reject Imple­
mentatIOn. To comply with federal law it would then merely have 
to state these reasons for reJection. 
For example, if a regulatory authority or nonregulated utility 
with broad discretIOn m state law to consIder many factors m mak­
mg its deCISIon, heard eVIdence that cost Justified rates would help 
achieve equity but would also adversely affect economIC develop­
ment, and it rejected Implementation of such rates due to its Im­
pact on development, it would have vIOlated neither state nor fed­
eral law Federal law would be satisfied because the reason for 
reJectmg Implementation of the standard was gIven. State law 
would be satisfied because the declSlon was based on the record. If 
a state found Implementation of a section 2621174 standard to be 
appropnate under state law but mappropnate to achIeve one of 
the purposes of conservation, efficIency or equity it could still Im­
plement that standard or a concept related to that standard. 175 
Consumers should be aware of the possibility of a partial or 
phased Implementation of a ratemakmg standard mcluding the pos­
sibility of some exceptions for some ratepayers. Section 2627(b)176 
permits ImplementatIOn of different177 ratemakmg standards, but 
only if permitted by state law If such different standards were Im­
plemented, the discuSSIOn above regarding state law appears to 
control. The Conference Report con tams an extensIve discussIOn of 
the ability to Implement partial or phased Implementation. It does 
not mention a need for Justification of such action m state law 178 
If such partial or phased Implementation was adopted, it IS 
unclear whether that would constitute Implementation of a 
174. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
175. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § Ill, at 73, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7807 See also 16 U.S.GA. § 2627(b) (West Cum. 
Supp. 1979). 
176. 16 U.S.GA. § 2627(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
177 "Different" according to the Conference Report Includes more or less 
stringent standards, or modification of the standards. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 
§ 117, at 81, reprinted In [1978]6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7815. 
178. ld. § 111, at 70-74, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 
7804-08. 
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ratemakmg standard. If it did not constitute such an Implementa­
tion, the reason would have to be stated, and compliance with sec­
tion 2621(c)(2)179 would be reqUlred. Further smce the Act itself 
gIves no authority for such a partIal or phased Implementation, 
presumably some authority under state law would have to be 
found, despite the Conference Report language. If, on the other 
hand, partial or phased Implementation was consIdered to be Im­
plementation of a standard m furtherance of the achievement of 
one of the Act's purposes, then no section 2621(b)(1)180 declaratIon 
needs to be made. Assummg such actIon was not barred by state 
law then, smce it supplements state law it would provIde sufficIent 
authority for such an ImplementatIon. The questIon of whether 
such partIal or phased ImplementatIon IS, m fact, ImplentatIon 
will have to await court decislOn. It seems fau to conclude, how­
ever that a court will only mterfere with an admIlllstratIve decI­
SIon to Implement partIally or In phases if the ImplementatIon un­
dertaken IS merely a token or symbolic one. 
2. Regulatory Standards 
Section 2623181 standards are treated In a fashIOn sImilar to 
sectIon 2621182 standards but with two Important differences. 183 
First, ImplementatIon of the latter s standards could be rejected 
even if found appropnate under state law and appropnate to 
achIeve one of the purposes of the Act. ThIS could be done without 
vlOlatmg federal law although such a rejectIon could vIolate state 
law With regard to the former s standards, it IS arguable that fed­
eral law itself prohibits then rejectIon where they are appropnate 
under state law and they achIeve one of the purposes of the tI­
tle. 184 SectIon 2623(a)(1)185 states that the standards contaIned m 
sectIon 2623(b), 186 with the exceptIon of sectIon 2623(b)(4)187 con­
cernIng termInatIon procedures, shall be adopted if appropnate to 
179. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(c)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 

lBO. ld. § 2621(b)(2). 

181. ld. § 2623. 
182. ld. § 2621. 
183. Whether state law permits such rejection would depend on the resolu­
tion of the Identical Issues raised with regard to rejection of § 2621 standards. 
184. As with § 2621 standards, the Secretary may Issue voluntary gUidelines 
pursuant to § 2641. See note 197 and accompanymg text supra. InqUiry was pub­
lished on April 12, 1979. 
185. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(a)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
186. ld. § 2623(b). 
187. ld. § 2623(b)(4). 
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carry out the purposes of thIs Chapter, IS otherwIse appropnate, 
and IS consIstent with otherwIse applicable State law "188 The 
seCTIon 2623(b)(4)189 standard shall be adopted if it IS found to be 
"appropnate and consIstent with otherWise applicable state law "190 
The CruCIal difference between the "may" of sectIOn 2621(c)191 and 
the "shall" of seCTIon 2623(a)192 reqUIres adopTIon of the latter s 
standards if they meet the tests of appropnateness. 
The only caveat to thIs reading of the legIslaTIon IS the other­
Wise appropnate" language of seCTIon 2623(a)(1)193 and "appropn­
ate" language of seCTIon 2623(a)(2).194 ThIs language appears to add 
another standard to the two prevIOusly discussed. Those standards 
pertamed to achIevmg one of the Act's purposes and mamtammg 
conSIstency with state law while these phrases seem to leave it to 
the unfettered discreTIon of the regulatory authority or nonregu­
lated utility to determme whether the standard IS appropnate for 
adoptIOn. 
Tills last mterpretaTIon of the "appropnate" language IS but­
tressed by the Conference Report. It states that discretIOn regard­
mg ImplementaTIon of seCTIons 2623 and 2621 standards IS broad. 
Further it states: "[The regulatory] authority and [nonregulated] 
utility are not reqUIred by these seCTIons to adopt or Implement 
such standards. "195 
It appears, therefore, that adopTIon of a sectIon 2623196 
standard IS mandatory if it IS appropnate to achIeve one of the pur­
poses of the Act and IS conSIstent with state law The statute, how­
ever, presents an exceptIOn for regulatory authority or nonregu­
lated utility The regulatory authority or nonregulated utility could 
find that the standard IS appropnate to achIeve one of the title s 
purposes and IS conSIstent with state law but not appropnate to 
adopt because of otherWIse applicable state law 197 Then adopTIon 
would not be requrred. 198 
188. ld. § 2623(a)(1). As with § 2623(a)(1) standards, § 2623 standards must be 
considered separately. The test IS applied to each standard separately not as group. 
189. ld. § 2623(b)(4). 
190. ld. § 2623(a)(2). 
191. ld. § 2621(c). 
192. ld. § 2623(a). 
193. ld. § 2623(a)(1). 
194. ld. § 2623(a)(2). 
195. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 113, at 75, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7809. 
196. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 

197 Id. § 2623(a). 

198. As with § 2621(c)(2), if standard IS not adopted the reason for the reJec­
tion must be stated III writing. 
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The second Important difference regards what constitutes 
adoption of a standard. AgaIn, sectIon 2627199 IS applicable, and 
the comments above pertinent to that sectIon are relevant. Unlike 
its statements about partIal or phased ImplementatIon of sectIon 
2621200 standards, however, the Conference Report In diSCUSSIng 
sectIon 2623201 standards specifically states, "AdoptIon of standards 
whICh vary InSIgnificantly from the standards spelled out m thIS 
sectIon may be treated as adoptIon of the standards for purpose of 
the subsectIon. "202 It appears, therefore, that unless the standard 
IS entIrely adopted, it must be treated as rejected. ThIS reqUIres 
that the reasons stated for such a rejectIon conform with sectIon 
2623(c) reqUIrements. 203 
3. L'feline Rates 
The proceeding concernmg lifeline rates must be an eVIden­
tIary heanng204 and, therefore, must mclude a written declSlon 
based on a written record. There are mtentIonally no statutory re­
qUIrements, however, regarding acceptance or rejectIon of such a 
rate form. The Conference Report states that while a full heanng IS 
reqUIred, there IS "no judgment made m Federal law as to how it 
should be resolved. "205 ThIS WIde open discretIon may make judi­
cIal reVIew of little consequence smce a court will be loath to sub­
stitute its expertIse for that of an agency supposedly expenenced m 
these matters. 
F Effect of Pnor Proceedings on the PURPA Agenda 
The drafters of the PURPA legIslatlOn recogmzed that many of 
the Issues they were addressmg were concepts not entIrely new to 
199. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2627 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
200. ld. § 2621. 
201. ld. § 2623. 
202. H.R. CONF REp supra note 12 § 113, at 77 repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7811. 
203. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The Conference Report m 
discussmg § 2627 does state that the conferees recogmze that the standards have to 
be adapted "to local conditions and particular situations. The Report goes on to say 
that states will continue to have [flexibility] m adopting rules or standards affecting 
electnc utilities. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 117, at 81, repnnted In [1978] 6 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7815. Nevertheless, glven the earlier comment 
m § 113 of the Conference Report, state may have some flexibility, but it may have 
to state that standard has been rejected if the measure adopted 1S not substantially 
slmilar to the measure stated m §§ 2623(b) and 2625(f)-(h). ld. at 77, repnnted In 
[1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 7811. 
204. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2624(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
205. H.R. CONF REP., supra note 12 § 114, at 77, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7811. 
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state utility regulatIon. They also recognIzed that reqUInng recon­
sIderatIOn of Issues prevIOusly dealt with by some regulatory au­
thoritIes and nonregulated utilitIes would be expenSIve and POSSI­
bly without benefit.206 Therefore, they mcluded m Title I two 
prOVlSlons to deal with thIs potentIal problem of duplicatIOn, sec­
tIons 2634207 and 2622{a).208 These prOVISIOns, despite theIr well 
mtentIoned attempt to aVOId duplicatIon, could make meanmgful 
mterventIon and partICIpatIon m PURP A consIderatIons difficult, if 
not Impossible. Agam, the treatment of the vanous portIons of the 
PURPA agenda IS different and each reqUIres a separate analysIs. 
Both sectIons 2634209 and 2662{a)210 are relevant to the dupli­
catIon questIons regarding consideratIon of the ImplementatIon of 
sectIon 2621211 standards. The drafters were concerned with dupli­
catIon of efforts made pnor to, and subsequent to, the enactment 
of PURPA. The problem of subsequent duplicatIon of efforts arose 
because Intervenors, In any proceeding commenced with respect to 
the rates of an electnc utility can mitIate consIderatIOn of the Im­
plementatIon of sectIon 2621212 standards. The drafters were espe­
Cially concerned that the power to InitIate thIs portIon of the 
PURPA agenda could be used solely for purposes of delaymg the 
rate proceeding process. 213 Therefore, they made it clear that if a 
standard already had been consIdered m accordance with the re­
qUIrements of thIS title, subsequent consIderatIons need not be as 
extensIve. 214 The subsequent conSIderatIons could take Into account 
any pnor determmatIons and the eVIdence upon whICh they were 
based. 215 There IS one limitatIon on thIS IncorporatIon by refer 
ence. If the conSIderatIon IS from a proceeding either completed at 
the tIme of enactment of the statute or pending at that tIme, the 
sectIon 2634216 reqUIrements concernmg substantIal compliance 
with the procedural aspects of PURPA must be met. There are no 
206. ld. § 124, at 85, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 
7819. 
207. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2634 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
208. ld. § 2622(a). 
209. ld. § 2634. 
210. ld. § 2622(a). 
211. ld. § 2621. 
212. ld. 
213. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 74, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7808. 
214. ld. 
215. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2622(a)(1)-(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
216. ld. § 2634. 
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limitations, other than state law and, ultimately Judicial review on 
mcorporatIon by reference from proceedings begun subsequent to 
the enactment of the Act.217 
Clearly the reference to a pnor proceeding poses a real threat 
to mtervenors who might not have participated m it. For example, 
if all homeowners who use electncity as a heat source wish to ar 
gue agamst seasonal rates but did not mtervene m an early pro­
ceeding when the Issue of such a standard was explored, they may 
be foreclosed from havmg a full heanng on this Issue. This would 
preclude theIr nght to present eVidence and cross-examme adverse 
witnesses m the subsequent proceeding even though their particu­
lar pomt of view was not represented at the earlier proceeding. 
The only possible protection agamst such an eventuality would 
be a state law that would prevent mcorporatIon m certam m­
stances. 218 Connecticut General Statutes,219 for example, reqUIre 
that before such mcorporatIon can be accomplished through admm­
IstratIve notice, parties must be appnsed of such a possibility and 
be given an opportunity to exam me the matenals and contest theIr 
mcluslOn. Thus, state law would msure, at a mmlmum, that the m­
corporation would not occur without notice and opportunity to ar­
gue why it should not be allowed. If the mcorporatlOn were not al­
lowed, then mtervenors would have an opportunity to mitIate the 
consideration of section 2621220 standards deSIred and to make the 
best case for adoption or reJection. Therefore, when faced with a 
possible deCISIOn that consideratIOn has already been performed, 
reference to state law IS critical. 
The limitatIon of section 2634221 regarding duplicatIOn of ef­
forts made pnor to passage of the Act applies to consideratIons of 
both sections 2621222 and 2623223 standards. It IS the latter s only 
limitation. The sectIon 2634224 limitatIon IS m two parts. The first 
refers to proceedings or actIons completed pnor to the Act's 
217. Presumably, if the reference IS from proceeding begun after the enact­
ment of the legislation, the proceeding would have been III full compliance with 
these procedural reqUIrements. If there IS not such full compliance, then the refer­
ence may not be permitted. 
218. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 112, at 75, reprmted m [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7809. 
219. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-178 (1979). 
220. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 

22l. ld. § 2634. 

222. ld. § 262l. 
223. ld. § 2623. 
224. ld. § 2634. 
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passage. As long as there has been "substantIal compliance"225 with 
the procedural reqUIrements of the Act and any of the section 
2621226 or section 2623227 standards have been duly consIdered 
and either Implemented or not, there need not be a subsequent 
consIderation of that same standard. Substantial compliance does 
not necessarily reqUIre "the full nght of particIpation and mterven­
tIon as reqUIred by [section] 2631. "228 It does, however at least 
with respect to sectIon 2621229 standards, mean that there has to 
have been a utility-by-utility analysIs of the appropnateness of 
these standards to carry out the purposes of the Act. 230 There has 
to be a consIderation of sectIon 2621231 standards relatIve to the 
Act's purposes, not Just to state law or other consIderations. No 
other gUIdance to the meanmg of "substantIal compliance" IS gIven. 
The decIsIOn of the regulatory authority and nonregulated utility m 
thIs regard, however, IS subject to JudicIal reVIew 
The second part of sectIon 2634 refers to proceedings or ac­
tIons commenced before passage of the Act but not yet completed. 
To aVOId duplicatIon, the reqUIrements of the Act must be 
complied with m that part of the proceeding or action occurnng 
after passage to the maxImum extent practicable except as 
otherwIse prOVIded m [sectIon] 2631(c)."232 ThIs language does not 
reqUIre notIce to have been Issued m accordance with the Act nor 
does it "reqUIre restartmg the entIre proceeding to gIve any person 
a nght to particIpate or mtervene if such nght would be untImely 
as stated m [sectIon 2631(c)]."233 
"Maxtmum extent practIcable" could, however, mean that ad­
ditIonal notice be rendered dunng the proceeding so that everyone 
can be appnsed of the new Importance of the proceeding and re­
spond accordingly Furthermore, it could mean that the proceed­
mg be adjourned until a later date to gIVe adequate time for prepa­
ration. Other practical solutions to the duplication problem eXIst. 
These mclude reopenmg a portIOn of the proceeding or allowmg 
225. ld. 
226. ld. § 2621. 
227. ld. § 2623. 
228. ld. 
229. ld. § 2621. 
230. n.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 124, at 85, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7819. 
231. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
232. ld. § 2634. 
233. n.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 124, at 85, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7819. 
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new eVIdence on only certaIn Issues. These steps would Insure that 
duplicatIon IS avoIded and at the same tIme msure that Intervenors 
are not demed an opportunity to present theIr best possible case. 
The Conference Report does state that if no determInatIOn has 
been made with regard to a sectIon 2621234 standard, then the sec­
tIon 2621(d)235 reqUIrements of a written declSlon based on findings 
and eVIdence on the record should be followed. 236 
Regarding lifeline rates, the legIslatIon IS clear that no heanng 
held or determmatIon made pnor to passage of the Act will suffice. 
The eVIdentIary proceeding reqUIred by the Act must be held sub­
sequent to passage of the Act. There must be full compliance with 
the procedural reqUlrements. SectIon 2634237 IS mapplicable. 238 
Apparently the conferees were not concerned with duplicatIon, 
and there IS little doubt that mtervenors will be prOVIded ample 
opportunity to be heard. 
Pnor proceedings, therefore, could, with the exceptIon of con­
sIderatIon of lifeline rates, have a substantIal Impact on the scope, 
and even on the necessity of PURPA heanngs. The Impact of such 
pnor proceedings on consIderatIon of the ratemakmg standards IS 
most severe. When the force of sectIon 2621(a),239 permittmg m­
corpotatIon by reference of eVIdence from pnor proceedings, IS 
combmed with the force of sectIon 2634,240 limitmg the procedural 
nghts of mtervenors, the former s reqUIrements may be met with 
little more than the most cursory proceeding. Furthermore, even 
such cursory proceedings may be unnecessary ThIS IS true smce 
the first part of sectIon 2634241 permits proceedings completed 
pnor to passage of the Act to satisfY the Act if they were conducted 
m substantIal compliance with the procedural reqUIrements of title 
I and were conSIdered the relevant standards. 
The reqUIrement of consIderatIon of sectIon 2623242 regulatory 
standards cannot be satIsfied by the mcorporatIon by reference 
from pnor proceedings. ThIS IS scant comfort, gIVen the power of 
234. 16 U.S.C.A § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
235. ld. § 2621(d). 
236. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 124, at 85, repnnted m [1978) 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7819. 
237 16 U.S.C.A. § 2634 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
238. ld. § 2624(c). 
239. ld. § 2621(a). 
240. ld. § 2634. 
241. ld. 
242. ld. § 2623. 
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the first part of section 2634243 whIch applies to the reqUIrements 
of section 2623244 as well as to the reqUIrements of section 2621. 245 
V JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Congress left most of the work of title I to those agencIes at 
the state level and mitIal enforcement of the Act to the state 
courtS.246 A utility or consumer demed the rIght gIven by sectIon 
2631{a)247 to mtervene and partIcIpate m a proceeding must first go 
to state court to enforce that nght. 248 If the state court fails to en­
force the nght, then access to the United States DIstnct Court IS 
available249 as well as to the state appellate process. 250 
The Conference Report makes clear that the mtent of JudicIal 
reVIew IS to make the enforcement of the nght to mtervene and 
partICIpate "as rapId as possible. "251 It permits access to the federal 
court system even if the mitIal demal m the state court was on the 
grounds that the appeal was premature or mterlocutory 252 
SIgnificantly litIgatIOn to protect mterventIon and parbcIpa­
243. ld. § 2634. 
244. ld. § 2623. 
245. ld. § 262l. 
246. The establishment of state courts as mitial appellate bodies IS subject to 
two exceptions. First, federal agency utilities may be excluded under § 2633(c)(2). 
Secondly the rIght of mtervention and participation by the Secretary of DOE IS per­
missible according to § 2631(a). 
247. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2631(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
248. ld. § 2632(b)(2). 
249. ld. § 2633(b)(2). 
250. ld. § 2633(b)(3). 
251. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 123, at 84, reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7818. What IS unclear IS the extent to whICh § 
2633(b)(3) permits Simultaneous appeal to state appellate courts and the federal 
courts with the possibility of conflicting deCISIOns. The language of this section pro­
tects the rIght of access to federal court even if review and enforcement IS bemg 
sought m any state court at any time. Presumably potential mtervenor could 
pursue both courses Simultaneously· mtervenmg and participating after the first fa­
vorable deCISIOn. Both courts, however, may balk at thiS "forum shoppmg. 
252. ld. It IS questionable whether federal court can be utilized if the dellial 
of relief In state court was based on procedural defect relating strictly to state 
law, such as Improper fonn of pleading. Perhaps, more Importantly, it IS debatable 
whether access to federal court would be pennitted if the state court rendered no de­
CISIOn. That IS, the state court heard the person appeal, but Simply took no action. 
The proceeding at which mtervention and participation was sought could be over 
before the state court made thiS deCISion, thereby possibly rendenng an appeal or 
federal court claim moot. In the event of thiS possibility, it may be appropnate to 
seek mJunctive relief of the pending state court deCISIOn. If the relief IS dellled, Im­
mediate access to federal court should be sought on the ground that any eventual re­
lief by the state court will be worthless. 
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tIon nghts does not extend to the nght to mitIate a consIderation of 
sectIOn 2621253 standards. Therefore, one could force a regulatory 
authority or nonregulated utility to permit an mterventIon through 
the above process but could not use it to force an mitIatIOn of the 
consIderation of the section 2621254 standards. The omISSIOn was 
apparently mtentIonal. The Conference Report states that the fed­
eral court "cannot reqUIre any partIcular outcome from the mter 
ventIon, nor that any Issue raIsed by an mtervenor be conSIdered 
appropnate. "255 
ThiS omiSSion, however, should not be mterpreted to mean 
that relief IS unavailable if a regulatory authority or nonregulated 
utility Ignores or disregards the reqUIrements of title I regarding 
consIderatIon of the ratemakmg or regulatory standards or lifeline 
rates and takes no action whatsoever withm the applicable time 
limits to conSider these Issues. SectIon 2633{c){1)256 permits any 
person mcluding the Secretary of DOE to bnng an action m state 
court257 pursuant to the procedures of that state court to enforce 
the title s reqUIrements. 258 Enforcement of obligations to hold 
heanngs and make determmatIons, for example, through the use of 
a writ of mandamus, can be achieved through this section. 259 
ASide from the situatIons noted above and selective reVIew by 
the United States Supreme Court of final declSlons of the hIghest 
state court,260 JudiCial enforcement of the reqUIrements of Title I IS 
left to the state courts pursuant to applicable state procedures. 261 
Those procedures mclude burdens of proof;262 methods of JudiCial 
reView' heanng de novo or on the record below' practice and 
253. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
254. Id. 
255. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 123, at 84, repnnted m [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7818. 
256. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2633(c)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
257 ThiS assumes that the utility In question IS not federal agency. If it IS, 
the enforcement action can be brought m federal court under § 2633(c)(2). 
258. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2633(c)(I) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
259. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 123, at 84, repnnted m [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7818. ThiS enforcement nght would probably not be 
npe until the time limits proVided for withm the Act had expired. What action must 
be accomplished withm the stated time limits IS open to some question. Further­
more, the question of whether any action must be taken IS open to some mterpreta­
tion given the uncertamties raised by § 2634. 
260. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2633(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
261. Id. § 2633(c)(I). 
262. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 123, at 84, repnnted m [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7818. 
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pleading; and form of relief. The only exceptions to thIs general 
deferral to state procedural rules are contamed m sectIons 
2633(c)(2)263 and 2633(c)(3).264 The former grants standing to appeal 
from any determmatIon made m any proceeding to any person who 
mtervened or otherwIse partIcIpated m the ongmal proceeding. 265 
The latter permits the Secretary of DOE to act as an amtcus cunae 
m any JudicIal reVIew of a proceeding even if the Secretary did not 
partIcIpate m the ongmal proceeding. 266 The scope of JudicIal re­
VIew authorIzed by title I IS limited mostly to reVIew of the actIons 
of the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility with regard to its 
treatment of procedural Issues. 267 
Any exceptIon to thIs limitatIon must be referred to state law 
smce the reVIew IS pursuant to any applicable state procedures. 268 
State procedures apparently mclude the scope of reVIew permitted 
by state law 269 Thus, the extent to whICh a court can reVIew the 
deCISIon of the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility and sub­
stitute its Judgment IS a subject for state law 270 
In most states, however, trus exceptIon will prOVIde little, if 
any check on the discretIon of regulatory authoritIes or non­
regulated utilities m dealing with the substantIve Issues raIsed by 
title I. Courts are loath to mterfere with the Judgment of admmIs­
tratIve agenCIes and, as a general rule, defer to theIr expertIse. 
They are usually bound, by statute or otherwIse, not to substitute 
theIr Judgment for that of the admmIstratIve agency TheIr reVIew 
will extend no further than to msure that all reqUIred procedural 
steps have been followed. 
As prevIously stated, the treatment and enforcement of all 
procedural nghts granted by title I are subject to JudiCIal reVIew 
263. 16 U.S.CA. § 2633(c)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
264. Id. § 2633(c)(3). 
265. ld. § 2633(c)(2). 
266. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 123, at 85, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7819. Unless pennitted by state law he could not InI­
tiate such an appeal unless he particIpated m the admmlstrative proceeding. Section 
2633(c)(1) also pennits appeals to be taken by other persons "if state law otherwise 
pennits such reVIew. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2633(c)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
267. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2633 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The focus on procedural IS­
sues IS not surpnsmg gIven that the Act, while Identifymg vanety of Issues to be 
discussed, mandates little with respect to the substantive area of utility regulation. 
268. ld. § 2633(c)(1). 
269. H.R. CONF REP supra note 12 § 123, at 84, repnnted In [1978] 6 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7797, 7818. 
270. ld. "The findings and determmations are reviewable under the sub­
stantive standards of review as established under State law ld. 
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These mclude the nght to mtervene and particIpate, the obligation 
to commence proceedings withm certam hme limits, .and the re­
qUIrement of heanngs and written determmatIOns contammg cer 
tam findings based on a record. 271 
JudicIal reVIew with regard to these procedural Issues should 
be more effective than with regard to substantive Issues. The 
courts are more familiar and comfortable with such Issues. In addi­
hon, deference to admIlllstratIve expertIse should be of less con­
cern to a court smce it presumably IS the expert m decIding if a 
procedural nght granted by statute has been observed m the 
admIlllstratIve process. To the extent there are uncertamtIes m the 
Act with regard to such procedural nghts, however, the state 
courts will be called upon to mterpret the mtent behmd the fed­
erallaw Some state courts will be reluctant to do so and may de­
fer to the Judgment of the regulatory authority or nonregulated 
utility on the grounds that it IS m the best position to resolve the 
uncertamty by reason of its familiarity with the law For example, 
title I reqUIres a heanng to be held to consIder sections 2621272 
and 2623273 standards. It says little about the type of hearmg and 
procedural safeguards reqUIred m that heanng. A regulatory au­
thority or nonregulated utility may try to argue that a hearmg does 
not reqUIre that mtervenors be granted the nght to cross-examme 
witnesses but merely that they be permitted to make a statement. 
A state court may defer to thIS mterpretahon. It may do so on the 
grounds that the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility knows 
best what constitutes a conSIderation of the standard and the type 
of eVIdence and record necessary to determme whether the Imple­
mentation or adoption of the standard will achIeve one of the pur 
poses of the title. 
An mtervenor faced with the above possibility IS not without 
hope. One can argue that the federal law mtended that a heanng 
would mclude the nght to cross-examme. In additIOn, "heanng" 
may be defined by state law to mclude the nght to cross-examme 
adverse witnesses and to particIpate fully 10 a tnal proceeding. If 
heanng IS so defined, then it could be argued that because the fed­
eral law IS a supplement to and not a replacement of state law 
these protectIOns of state law must extend to the heanngs. To do 
271. Of course, any procedural nghts granted by state law are subject to Judi­
Cial review to the extent pennitted or reqUired by state law. 
272. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
273. [d. § 2623. 
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otheIWlse would constitute a vIOlatIon of state law Since state law 
cannot be Ignored, any heanng that did not mclude these safe­
guards would be mnnn without regard to the resolutIon of the 
questIon under federal law It appears, therefore, that while Judi­
CIal reVIew can provIde some relief, its ability to remedy all but the 
clearest procedural vIOlatIons of law IS limited. 
VI. PURPA STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS 
What must be ObVIOUS to even a casual observer IS that Title I 
of PURPA, while presentmg many possibilitIes for favorably affect­
mg the regulatIon and practIces of electnc utilitIes, mandates no 
actual change m current utility practIces. There IS not any guaran­
tee that the consIderatIon of ratemakmg and regulatory standards 
that appear to be reqUIred will take place m an effectIve and 
worthwhile manner. Given these CIrcumstances, consumers must 
carefully consIder the strategy to be employed m order to use 
PURPA to theIr utmost advantage. 
It IS Impossible to desIgn an overall strategy that will work 
best m every possible situatIon. Each state regulatory authority and 
utility will respond differently to PURPA. Therefore, strategy must 
be planned accordingly There are, however, several consIderatIons 
to be noted for desIgmng the appropnate strategy 
First, the overall politIcal climate should be assessed, and the 
general populatIon s level of conSCIOusness about the Issues raIsed 
by the PURPA agenda should be determmed. If the questIon of 
electnc rate and regulatory reform IS not a public Issue, the 
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility will be freer to dis­
pense with the PURPA agenda expediently Heanngs will be SIm­
ple and qUIck, barely meetmg the mInImUm PURPA reqUIrements. 
If the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility IS ill-disposed to 
PURPA, even such rudimentary compliance may not be accom­
plished. 
If, on the other hand, utility Issues have been the subject of 
substantIal public debate, it IS more likely that the Issues may not 
be swept successfully under the rug. There will be less success m 
efforts by a regulatory authority or nonregulated utility to claIm, 
for example, that sectIon 2634274 frees it from the need for any ad­
ditIonal hearmgs or proceedings. Heanngs are more likely to be 
full tnal proceedings rather than Just notIce and comment proceed­
274. [d. § 2634. 
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mgs. In several states, efforts at legIslatIon sImilar to PURPA have 
failed on the ground that the federal law has taken care of the 
problem. If it can be demonstrated that the federal law has not 
resolved the problem, additIonal state legIslatIon could be forth­
commg. 
Secondly the amount of money available to regulatory author 
itIes will be an Important concern. Funding will amount to $10 
million275 for the fiscal year 1979-80, with that money scheduled to 
become available m October 1979. Without adequate funds, any 
exam matI on of the PURPA agenda will, almost by definitIon, be 
cursory There must be funds for adequate staff and consultants to 
make a complete mqUIry mto the PURPA agenda. 
ThIrdly the attitude of the state regulatory authority or 
nonregulated utility will also be CruCIal m plannmg a PURPA strat­
egy If a state Public UtilitIes CommIssIon consIders the PURPA 
agenda to be a waste of tIme, then strategy will have to take thIS 
mto account. It may dictate, for example, that a consIderatIon of 
section 2621276 standards be mitIated as soon as possible. As dis­
cussed, it may be possible for a consIderatIon of these standards to 
be aVOIded for years and an expeditIous mvocatIon of the power to 
mitIate the consIderatIon may be reqUIred. 
Fourthly the politIcal and financIal strength of consumer 
groups or those representmg them could also dictate PURPA strat­
egy If, for example, a consumer group lacks suffiCIent funds, it 
may WIsh to delay conSIderation of all or a portIOn of the PURPA 
agenda until suffiCIent funds are available through sectIOn 2632277 
or some other source. 278 
There may be other reasons why a delay m undertakmg the 
PURPA agenda should be conSIdered. It may be Important to wait 
until necessary mformatIon pursuant to section 2643279 IS available. 
275. ThIs Includes the total federal appropnation for state regulatory authorities 
and nonregulated utilities to deal with PVRPA consIderations. H.R. 4930, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Additional sums may be available In particular JUrISdictions 
through state appropnations, other federal grants, or assessment powers provIded for 
In state law. 
276. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2621 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 

277 Id. § 2632. 

278. It may be conSIderable length of time before funding mechamsm pur­
suant to § 2632(b) IS established with suffiCIent scope to be meamngful. 
279. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2643 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). ThIS section reqUIres utilities 
to file with the Federal Energy Regulatory CommIssIOn and any state regulatory au­
thority whIch has ratemakIng authority for that utility certaIn Information regarding 
the costs of servIng its customers. The Information reqUIred to be filed IS extensIve 
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ThIS could take up to two years or even longer m some m­
stances. 280 
Of course, consumers may have little control over the tImmg 
of consIderatIon of the PURPA agenda. ConsIderatIon may be 
undertaken of the entIre PURPA agenda by the regulatory author­
ity or nonregulated utility on its own mitIahve as has already 
occurred m some JunsdictIons. In additIon, a utility or DOE could 
mitIate consIderatIon of sectIon 2621281 standards even agamst the 
WIshes of the regulatory authority or nonregulated utility These 
proceedings cannot be Ignored by consumers because of the Impact 
they may have on future proceedings. If they are Ignored, consum­
ers at a later tIme, when they are prepared to address the PURPA 
agenda, may find themselves shut out of effectIve partIcIpatIon be­
cause of the pnor proceeding rule of sectIons 2622282 and 2634. 283 
To aVOId thIS possibility consumers should be monitonng all pro­
ceedings that could consIder the PURPA agenda and be prepared 
to mtervene if such a consIderatIOn commences. 284 
Given these strategIc problems raised by the uncertaintIes of 
PURPA, consumers with limited resources should consIder tar­
getmg theIr resources to those areas of greatest concern. If a state 
has already established adequate, although not perfect, procedures 
that must be followed pnor to termmation of servIce or if a state 
regulatory authority has deCIded that tIme of use rates are deSIr 
able and ImplementatIon has begun, although not at a rapId 
enough pace, then perhaps a consumer group, assummg it IS gen­
erally m favor of these measures, should concentrate on the other 
PURPA Issues. It could choose to concentrate on adequate con­
sumer mformatIon, automatIc adjustment clauses, or mtervenor 
funding. While such a strategy may preclude complete relief, it 
does make some relief more likely 
and mcludes both cost mfonnation and consumption pattern mfonnation that will be 
helpful m makmg detennmations with regard to the Impact of Implementing the § 
2621 standards. The mfonnation, however, does not have to be filed until two years 
after the enactment of the Act. Therefore, the mformation need not be filed until No­
vember, 1980. When filed, the mformation must be made available to the public. 
The exact detail on what mformation must be filed and the fonnat for filing can be 
found at 44 Fed. Reg. 33,847 (1979). 
280. 16 V.S.C.A. § 2643(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
281. ld. § 2621. 
282. ld. § 2622. 
283. ld. § 2634. 
284. Monitonng should be done carefully to aVOid the problems of untimely m­
tervention. ld. § 2631(c). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The PURPA legIslation IS a result of sIgnificant compromIse. A 
decIsIon on whether the legIslation IS meanIngful must wait until 
answers to the questions raIsed hereIn are provIded. These answers 
will come over the next several years as the result of action by 
regulatory bodies, utilities, and consumer groups. It IS conceIvable 
that PURPA will be Ignored and will result In little regulatory ac­
tion of any kInd. On the other hand, if state regulatory bodies 
adopt the spIrit of PURPA, SIgnificant activity and advancement In 
utility ratemakIng can be expected. 
In order for PURPA to fulfill its purpose, it IS critIcal that ade­
quate funding be proVIded consumer groups and regulatory 
agencIes. The funding IS reqUIred if they are to be gIven the capa­
bility of dealing In a substantive way with the Issues raIsed by 
PURPA. Without such adequate funding, state regulatory bodies 
will be forced to exerCIse then discretion to aVOId the expense of 
dealing with PURPA Issues. It would be unfortunate if the current 
mood of less regulatIon and less government Involvement were 
used to defeat the Intent of PURPA. The government Involvement 
already eXIsts through the substantial array of regulatory bodies. 
Additional funding, partIcularly for consumer groups, will enhance 
and not overburden the eXIstIng regulatory scheme. ThIS IS one 
area In whICh Increased government Involvement will actually re­
sult In Increased control not by the government but by the public. 
